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1. Introduction
* 
The tasks as well as the types of co-operatives within an economy have con-
tinuously been discussed for nearly two hundred years. Since the days of 
Owen, the principles as well as the appearance of co-operatives have been 
heavily disputed. This became evident by the controversy between Huber, 
Schulze-Delitzsch, and Lassalle (Faust 1977: 255ff) on whether co-operatives 
are self-help instruments and whether or not governmental help should be ap-
plied for or avoided. So far, this question has not been answered in a generally 
accepted way. 
During the last thirty years, however, the discussion on the optimal co-
operative model has not only lost some momentum, but has changed very 
much in substance. In the meantime, fundamental decisions dating from the 
very beginning of co-operative history have been accepted far and wide. 
Namely the disappearance of socialist co-operatives that was caused by the 
failure of socialist economies has led to a certain harmony.  
Even on this basis, however, there exist differences of opinion on the opti-
mal structures within the accepted framework. The controversy within the dis-
cussion is increased by the requirements imposed on co-operatives that have 
been changed by the development of markets and competition within a capital-
ist society. 
Currently, two facets of co-operatives are simultaneously regarded as prob-
lematic: the corporate governance system within German co-operatives and 
the promotion principle – the obligation of a co-operative to improve the eco-
nomic situation of its members with the help of its services. If these two focal 
points are considered simultaneously, the question arises whether German co-
operatives are still member-driven and -oriented organisations. At the same 
time it needs to be asked, what steps can be taken to bring organisational re-
quirements and members’ interests closer together. 
2.  Co-operative Ideologies in Capitalism 
The historical development of co-operatives was the result of activities from 
both practitioners and scientists. These joint efforts, however, did not prevent 
fundamental disagreements, especially concerning the role and the aims of co-
                                           
*   This publication is an extended and revised version of a paper that has been submitted 
for presentation at the XIV International Economic History Congress in Helsinki, 21
st-
25
th August 2006. It has been prepared as part of the research project „Mitgliederförde-
rung und Erfolgsmessung in Genossenschaften“ (promotion of members and measuring 
success in co-operatives), carried out by the Forschungsgruppe für Kooperation, Netz-
werke und Unternehmenstheorie” of Hochschule Wismar and Institut für Genossen-
schaftswesen an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Gratefully I acknowledge the fi-
nancial and organizational support of Forschungs-GmbH Wismar.   6 
operatives. As a result of the disputes and inability to agree, co-operative ide-
ologies evolved, that tended to “take up ideal-type dedications as well as uto-
pias” (Engelhardt 1994: 136), even though the very core of modern co-
operative development was more a question of pragmatical help as was shown 
by the Rochdale Pioneers (Brazda 1994). 
2.1.  Motives for the Development of the First Co-operatives 
Starting point of the modern co-operative movement was the so-called “social 
question” that arose together with industrialisation (Hasselmann 1971: 129; 
Boettcher 1983: 93f). The craftsmen were unable to withstand the competition 
of factory-made goods. In the new manufacturing plants, goods were produced 
faster, cheaper, and in a better quality. Many craftsmen were forced out of 
business and either became dependent workers or had no employment at all. 
The social impact was disastrous: Due to the absence of a social security sys-
tem, a large percentage of middle class people were endangered to plight and 
pauperisation. 
Considering the social impacts of industrialisation on the losers of this de-
velopment process, Schulze-Delitzsch declared in 1858: “Considering that not 
only a few formerly independent master craftsmen are forced to look for em-
ployment in factories, it may well be assumed that the whole group of crafts-
men will degrade to plain workers in those large entities and will enlarge the 
wretched factory proletariat. These aforementioned facts lead to the conclu-
sion that the plight of the working classes is the result of the developing proc-
ess of the new industries” (Schulze-Delitzsch 1858).
1 
Based on this analysis, pioneers of co-operation like Owen, Schulze-De-
litzsch, and Raiffeisen considered the co-ordinated self-help of the afflicted 
people as the only chance for improvement either with or without governmen-
tal help. Consistently, the first co-operatives were founded in England (Digby 
1971: 12), Germany, and France – the countries most affected by industrialisa-
tion at that time. Even though these very first co-operatives were established 
under similar conditions, they differed greatly as far as their economic and po-
litical goals were concerned. 
2.2.  Social Aims of Early Co-operatives 
A major distinction can be drawn according to the co-operatives' view of the 
capitalist system (Neumann 1975: 32). Right from the start, two different con-
cepts evolved and found followers and supporters among the early co-
operators: 
a)  “that of the free co-operative association based on self-help, self-respon-
                                           
1  Quoted according to Boettcher (1983: 95); translation by the author.   7
sibility and independent organization for the autonomous formation of sav-
ings from below, while remaining neutral as far as politics and religion are 
concerned; and 
b) that of a politically regimented co-operative association within the concep-
tual context of theoretical and idealistic socialism.” (Müller 1994: 436f) 
The early co-operatives in England, influenced by the example of Owen and 
the Rochdale Pioneers, were aimed at overcoming the capitalist system 
(Hasselmann 1968: 22), while the co-operatives in Germany, founded by 
Schulze-Delitzsch and Raiffeisen, focused on improving the situation of the 
co-operative's members within the existing system (Steding 1994: 11; Koch 
1994: 25).  
These ideological differences became obvious in the preferred type of co-
operative: consumer co-operatives and worker’s co-operatives on the one hand 
(Watkins 1969: 22), credit co-operatives, purchasing associations, and retail 
co-operatives on the other. It should be mentioned, however, that there were 
exemptions to this rule of thumb, e. g. the "bourgeois" consumer co-operatives 
(Brazda/Todev/Schediwy 1996).  
Even after all the years that have passed since the Rochdale experiment in 
1844 (Hasselmann 1968: 9), it is not only possible but fairly easy to recognise 
the fundamental differences between the different social aims, as they are pur-
sued by individual co-operatives (Boettcher 1985: 32-35). Responsible for this 
development are not only the two different concepts, but also the continuing 
differences in the political beliefs of the co-operators that still exert their in-
fluence on the development of the co-operative movement. 
2.2.1. Overcoming  Capitalism 
One source of co-operative thought and political beliefs can be traced to 
Owen, who had been labelled by Marx as an “utopian” socialist (Hasselmann 
1971: 130) and is regarded as the “father of the co-operative movement” 
(Digby 1971: 13). He recognised that industrialisation endangered the liveli-
hood of the workers and thereby the society in its entirety. He was in favour of 
“self-supporting colonies” as a suitable solution, a system of colonies of 
workers with joint production co-operatives at their core. Hasselmann charac-
terised these as “elements of a new economic order” (1971: 138). In England 
as well as in Germany, consumer co-operatives were of major importance 
(Digby 1971: 45ff; Novy/Prinz 1985: 18ff; Kaltenborn 1993: 20ff). They were 
not only supposed to act as reservoirs for funds but also as instruments of tran-
sition towards a different society (Brambosch 1985: 34ff). 
In this context, it needs to be remembered that Owen, as well as other early 
socialists, was not aiming at a revolution or a forced overthrow of the existing 
order but at economic improvements and free self-determination outside of the   8 
capitalist system. From an overall perspective, these attempts were not very 
successful, however, this "train of thought" influenced the "économie sociale" 
school of thought in France, Italy and other countries in the South of Europe. 
It has also left its marks in the concept of commonweal economy which is pre-
dominantly supported by the labour movement and (post-)socialist political 
parties.  
The idea of using co-operatives as instruments of establishing socialist 
economies was primarily tried out in the so-called second world, where they 
were based on Lenin’s co-operative approach (Hartwig 1985: 220; To-
dev/Brazda/Laurinkari 1992: 37ff). He considered them suitable schools for 
improving socialist consciousness. Due to this view, however, these co-
operatives differed greatly from their namesakes in capitalism, as they were 
primarily oriented towards political goals and tended to neglect their mem-
bers’ interests (Todev/Rönnebeck/Brazda 1994). In consequence, the principle 
of self-help was not obeyed. This could be observed in all socialist countries, 
in Eastern Europe as well as in Africa or Asia (Kleer/Laurinkari/Brazda 1996: 
38ff; Steding/Kramer 1998: 35ff; Degineh/Kramer 1996: 9ff; Chennamane-
ni/Eisen 1998: 13f). 
2.2.2. Reforming  Capitalism 
The opponent opinion leaders were Raiffeisen and Schulze-Delitzsch (Faust 
1949; Heuss 1956; Koch 1988). Their co-operative ideas, however, were quite 
different. While Owen’s efforts focused on dependent workers, German co-
operatives were meant for farmers and craftsmen. For that reason, these co-
operatives “bore the imprint of the middle classes” (Hasselmann 1971: 134). 
Even the joint production co-operatives that Schulze-Delitzsch saw as the “cli-
max” of his co-operative system (Schulze-Delitzsch 1909: 235) showed the 
characteristic features of workshop mergers. 
The inability of craftsmen and farmers to compete with industrialists was 
regarded as the main problem (Albrecht 1965: 33). Schulze-Delitzsch there-
fore considered it his duty to improve the competitive situation of the crafts-
men. “This means offering him the same opportunities for his economic per-
formance as are available to industrialists. This method does not shake the 
foundations of society; on the contrary, it prevents ‘the dreaded rupture’ and 
offers ‘stability for the social structure from within’.”
2 Raiffeisen, who lived in 
the Westerwald region, was more concerned about the rural communities. 
Based on his experience as mayor of small Westerwald villages, he saw co-
operatives as helpful instruments for farmers and other people in similar re-
gions. He was especially in favour of establishing credit co-operatives as a 
                                           
2  Albrecht (1965: 33); translation by the author.   9
step against usury (Bauer 1993).
3 
In opposition to early and utopian socialists, Raiffeisen and Schulze-De-
litzsch considered the market economy as a way to solve problems; predomi-
nantly those of the small-scale producers that required support to conquer the 
market barriers. The necessary help was to come from within their own group 
by organising co-operatives as self-help organisations. 
2.3.  Current Social Ideology of Co-operatives 
By now, this view of co-operatives as instruments to reform capitalism is 
widely accepted in those European countries that follow a market-oriented de-
velopment path. Nowadays, some politicians and co-operators even deny that 
they are an attempt to reform capitalism, at least to a certain degree. Co-
operatives as a stage of transition towards socialism are existent only in coun-
tries with a planned economy, in which case they have lost their character as 
self-help organisations. Instead, they are used as instruments to control as well 
as fulfil the economic plans, set up by the government. 
Market-oriented co-operatives have become the predominant type. Never-
theless, they still differ from each other, even though the most obvious differ-
ences are by now limited to their legal status and form (Münkner 1984: 197ff). 
As far as their economic duties and the promotion task of strengthening their 
members’ economic capacities are concerned, they are very much alike. 
The co-operatives continue to follow the principles of self-help, self-ad-
ministration, and self-responsibility. At their core, they still try to fulfil the 
needs and wants of their members, thereby carrying on with a special ethic 
tradition within the co-operative movement (Faust 1968: 36), even though dur-
ing the last centuries market influences have caused tremendous changes in 
the original co-operative concept. The internal structure as well as the respon-
sibilities of a current market-oriented co-operative are different from its prede-
cessors. 
3.  Co-operatives in a Market Economy 
Taking into account that modern co-operatives appeared on the stage nearly 
150 years ago and are still in existence today, the concept of co-operative so-
cieties seems to possess some incentives of its own. Otherwise, co-operation 
would have lost its appeal and co-operatives would have vanished in the 
meantime. 
                                           
3  A current example for a similar type of organisation is the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh 
(Yunus 1997, Yunus/Jolis 1999).   10 
3.1.  Definition of the Co-operative Concept 
Reviewing the concept of co-operation, Boettcher (1980: 1ff) considers three 
elements to be the main characteristics of a modern, market-oriented co-
operative: 
1.  A group of economically engaged individuals, 
2.  a joint undertaking, 
3.  the duty of promoting the co-operative’s members. 
While the first two criteria are valid for numerous enterprises, the obligation to 
promote its members makes the co-operative society stand out from the wide 
range of business entities and other organisations. This promotional duty de-
fines the main purpose of the co-operative: offering goods and services for the 
members’ economies, for households as well as for enterprises (Boettcher 
1980: 2; Dülfer 1976: 304; Henzler: 1970: 196ff), thereby increasing the eco-
nomic welfare of their members. 
In this respect, the co-operative may be defined as a society with an unlim-
ited number of members, established for the purpose of promoting the liveli-
hood or the enterprises of their members with the help of a joint business (Sel-
lien/Sellien 1980: 1678). In order to do so, it is based on a certain set of gen-
eral ideas and follows widely accepted principles and practices (Münkner 
1995a: IIIf; cf. annex I), namely  
•  Self-help based on solidarity, 
•  member promotion, 
•  identity, 
•  democratic management and control, 
•  economic efficiency, 
•  voluntary association, 
•  autonomy, 
•  fair and just distribution of the results, 
•  open membership, 
•  indivisible reserve fund, and 
•  promotion of education. 
It should be mentioned, however, that the individual co-operatives are free to 
emphasise some of these principles stronger than others, according to the aims 
of their members and their promotion duty. 
3.2.  The European Co-operative Discussion 
Over the whole period of their existence, co-operatives have been under two-
fold pressure. On the one hand, they are integrated into the capitalist market 
economy, where they have to withstand competition and distinguish them-
selves from capitalist enterprises. These requirements are shown in the princi-  11
ples of member promotion and economic efficiency. On the other hand, they 
fulfil social responsibilities and are based on the principle of solidarity 
(Flieger 1996: 20ff) which means that they are not only group-oriented but 
also have to consider the values, norms, traditions, morals, and the ideology of 
the group (Patera 1994: 822). The result has been that some practitioners and 
scientists consider co-operatives to be a part of a commonweal economy (Zer-
che/Schmale 1994: 123ff), which has caused heated disputes regarding the 
ranking and the importance of the principle of solidarity as opposed to the 
other co-operative principles, namely the principles of self-help and economic 
efficiency. 
3.2.1.  Distinction from Capitalist Enterprises 
The history of co-operative societies shows that there exists a certain tension 
between co-operatives, on the one hand, and capitalism or precisely capitalist 
enterprises, on the other hand. The need to distinguish themselves from such 
enterprises still plays an important role in the way co-operatives see them-
selves; primarily in France, where the co-operative movement seems to be 
closer to its ideological roots and where this distinction is emphasised (Boet-
tcher 1980: 2). 
According to the French view, as summarised by Boettcher (1980: 3), “en-
terprises” are always of a capitalist nature, while co-operatives only establish a 
“business” as a technical unit that has to cover its costs. Such a co-operative 
business is not oriented towards a market. Only enterprises are market-
oriented and aim at gains or profit. The latter may by chance achieve a sur-
plus; however, this surplus has to be given back to the members as “reim-
bursements” as soon as possible. 
From the German point of view, such a distinguishing line loses its clarity. 
This is mainly due to the co-operatives’ embeddedness in a society which is 
strongly influenced by a market economy.
4 In the German view, it is doubtful 
whether a co-operative without autonomous orientation towards markets is 
able to exist at all (Boettcher 1980: 3). This implies that co-operatives are not 
only permitted to be enterprises; but, in most cases, they definitely are enter-
prises. This is due to the circumstance that the "business" term cannot be ap-
plied in a narrow sense, if the co-operative is integrated in a market in order to 
fulfil its tasks. 
Philosophical as the point may seem it nevertheless has caused not only 
numerous heated discussions, but is also one of the reasons why co-operative 
                                           
4  Exceptions to this rule are some workers’ co-operatives that were founded as alterna-
tives to traditional business and employment. Regarding their goals and the way they see 
themselves they are closer to the concept of "économie sociale" than most other co-
operatives (Kramer 1997a: 110f; Münkner 1995b).   12 
federations in Western Europe have been unable to find a joint perspective 
regarding the concept of an “économie sociale”. Even though the day-to-day 
activities of the co-operatives in Western Europe do not seem to be influenced 
by this facet of their concept, the different business philosophies are still in 
existence and lead to misunderstandings regarding the role of co-operatives 
within a market economy. Solidarity with non-members of the co-operative, as 
emphasised by supporters of commonweal co-operatives, is easier to realise 
from the French point of view. If the co-operative is not aiming for a profit but 
only trying to cover its costs, if may be able to offer its goods at a lower price 
than its competitors, thereby increasing market pressure. 
The actual business behaviour of co-operatives, however, indicates that 
capitalist as well as co-operative enterprises aim for profit in the market, even 
if only to maintain their economic substance. Nevertheless, important distinc-
tions between co-operatives and capitalist enterprises do exist, mainly in the 
way the profits are spent because co-operatives have to follow their promo-
tional obligations. 
3.2.2. Co-operative  Goals 
The duty of promoting the co-operative’s members determines the business 
goals the co-operative is aiming for, since the promotional duty has to be de-
fined by the members themselves. It needs to be mentioned, that these goals 
depend on the needs of the members. The goals may well serve the common 
good, however, co-operatives are not primarily intended to be part of a welfare 
system. Instead, they are self-help organisations; therefore, the economic pro-
motion of their members is of primary importance in comparison to any other 
goals (Engelhardt 1976: 290). This is true even for workers’ co-operatives 
(Kramer 1999). There exists, however, some tension with regard to other eco-
nomic goals (Dülfer 1972: 324, Dülfer 1995: 191ff).
. 
In general, co-operative market activities are beneficial to non-members 
and/or the general public as well. This is even more true if the co-operative is 
a newcomer in the market. Neumann outlines several of the economic effects 
that are not only advantageous for the co-operative’s members; but, at the 
same time influence the complete market (Neumann 1972: 6f): 
1.  new functions via increased competition, 
2.  eliminating monopolistic tendencies (Fleischmann 1972: 161ff),  
3.  offer of new goods and services. 
It may be assumed that accepting new functions in order to realise economies 
of size will probably have only a limited influence on the market, whereas 
eliminating monopolistic tendencies and offering new goods and services are 
of greater importance and tend to increase competition. It is to be expected 
that, in the first case, the former monopolist will lower his prices, while, in the   13
second case, the competitors will change their range of products
5 to avoid los-
ing customers. 
Due to these favourable market influences, co-operatives have for some 
time and by a minority of their supporters been regarded as public utilities 
(Granichstaedten-Czerva 1911: 43; Schnorr von Carolsfeld 1982: 7) or even as 
being in the public interest (Sonnemann 1977: 151). Such an understanding, 
however, is wrong it does not reflect the co-operative’s character of an eco-
nomic self-help organisation by the members and for the members (Kramer 
1997c). 
The market activities of co-operatives may even be disadvantageous for the 
economy. This happens in those cases when the co-operative achieves the role 
of being the dominating enterprise in a market or even becomes a monopolist 
(Fleischmann 1972: 159ff; Hamm 1997: 59ff). If this happens, either the com-
petitors or the anti-trust authorities need to take charge. Due to the federative 
system within most co-operative branches, such a situation is more likely to 
occur on the secondary or even on the apex level than for a primary co-
operative. 
4.  Structural Economic Types of the Co-operative According to Dülfer 
During the past decades, co-operatives have become increasingly aware of 
market forces (e. g. Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raif-
feisenbanken 1999: 13ff). Correspondingly, the need to adapt to the market 
forces rose, leading to the evolution of new organizational types and structures 
(Dülfer 1957: 62). Due to these developments, the term “co-operative” cur-
rently covers a considerably broader range of co-operative structures than it 
used to do. It is necessary to distinguish the main types before entering into a 
discussion of conceptual co-operative problems. 
Dülfer (1995: 93ff) offered an approach that has proven very helpful in this 
context and is therefore widely accepted (Zerche et al. 1998: 79). He distin-
guishes between three main structural types of modern co-operative societies: 
“Executively Operating Co-operatives” (traditional co-operatives), “Market-
Linkage Co-operatives” (market co-operatives) and “Integrated Co-operati-
ves”. 
4.1.  Executively Operating Co-operative (traditional co-operative) 
The executively operating co-operative has developed from collective order-
                                           
5  Such a restructuring of the range of products need not happen, e. g. if the new product 
opens a market that is of no economic interest to the competitors, e. g. in the banking 
market (Neumann 1972: 7). The Ökobank eG proved to be such an example (Rommel 
1992, esp. pp. 19ff).   14 
ing. Two types of this co-operative may be distinguished: a primitive version 
and a higher developed one. Dülfer characterizes the primitive type as follows: 
“In this type, ... the group specially elects an executive board that only has to 
collect the members’ wishes and later on distribute the acquired goods among 
the recipients. This board is not permitted to make own decisions. It only 
transforms the received information into collective information which is 
passed on as an order to the supplier.”
6 The types of goods as well as their 
quantities are well defined; there is no need for additional control through a 
promotional obligation, as this kind of co-operative only allows for promo-
tional activity. 
The higher developed type of the executively operating co-operative devel-
oped with the necessity of stock-keeping. Co-operative warehousing evolved 
as a way to reduce costs through quantity discounts and decreased risks of de-
ferred shipment. In this way, the co-operative shows the first signs of a real 
business enterprise, e. g. leasing warehouse capacities. As opposed to the 
primitive type, the stock-keeping aspect of the higher developed executively 
operating co-operative disables the members from influencing the co-
operative’s services in the short run. However, the co-operative still bears the 
significant features of an executive instrument for the members’ interests 
(Dülfer 1995: 94). 
Due to the co-operative’s independence which goes hand in hand with 
stock-keeping, a divergence of the co-operative’s activities and the members’ 
wishes is possible. However, defining the goals is comparatively simple if the 
principles of efficiency and profitability are obeyed. It needs to be mentioned, 
though, that such an implementation causes a certain change of meaning as far 
the promotional obligation is concerned. With regard to market relations of the 
co-operative, it may be stated that no market relations exist between the mem-
bers and their co-operative. These exist only between the co-operative and the 
opposite side of the market, regardless of whether that is the demand side or 
the supply side. 
4.2.  Market-Linkage Co-operative (market co-operative) 
Market-linkage co-operatives and executively operating co-operatives differ 
mainly in the weaker ties between the co-operative and its members. The mar-
ket-linkage co-operative has developed typical features of an enterprise, e. g. 
hired staff, management structures, an internal hierarchical structure. This for-
malization of the enterprise, which is quite typical for all higher developed 
organizations, leads to a certain distance between members and hired manag-
ers. In the special case of a market-linkage co-operative, this distance is in-
creased due to the considerable amount of business that is done with non-
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members (Zerche et al. 1998: 93). 
A result of these transactions with non-members is the reduced economic 
importance of the members. The members identify themselves with their co-
operative less strongly than in the case of a traditional co-operative. The ties 
that bind co-operative enterprise and co-operative member have weakened. 
Due to this slack, the relations between the co-operative and its members have 
changed into relations similar to those between a capitalist enterprise and its 
customers (Dülfer 1960: 18). 
In comparison to the executively operating co-operative, the market-linkage 
co-operative is influenced to a greater degree by the “disturbing influences of 
competition”
7 that require a more pronounced management and control sys-
tem. Therefore, professionals from outside the co-operative are hired for the 
co-operative’s top management positions and even for the executive board. 
Their know-how is necessary for the market success of the co-operative. Such 
integration of outsiders, however, may create conflicts because the goals and 
preferences of hired experts are different from those of members (Kramer 
1997b: 29ff). 
The co-operative society gains more independence from its members and 
becomes more of an enterprise than before. With the hiring of management 
professionals, members lose an important part of their control and their influ-
ence in the co-operative. Due to these developments, the relationship between 
the co-operative and its members shows even more similarities to the relation-
ship between a customer on the market and an enterprise. Therefore, the pro-
motion task gains additional importance in order to avoid the transformation 
of the co-operative society into a commercial enterprise. In spite of the in-
creased importance of the promotion duty, it becomes harder to define for or-
ganizational as well as informational reasons. 
4.3. Integrated  Co-operative 
While the market-linkage co-operative (e. g. a credit co-operative) is charac-
terized by a weaker relationship between co-operative and members, the fea-
tures of the integrated co-operative (e. g. a taxi co-operative) are to the con-
trary: the strength of the relationship has increased. The closer co-operation 
between the co-operative and its members is a result of the higher degree of 
concentration on the market. This can be observed on the retail market for 
food products, where co-operatives compete with retail outlets that belong to 
big chains or wholesalers. A loose relationship, such as the one between a 
member and a market linkage co-operative, would be highly disadvantageous 
(e. g. no corporate identity; no common public relation concept; a high degree 
of non-uniformity among the co-operatives, even though they belong to the 
                                           
7   Dülfer (1960: 18); translation by the author.   16 
same federation and act on similar markets). 
The management of the co-operative enterprise therefore has to accept new 
responsibilities which have evolved from the co-operative’s duties with regard 
to information (Dülfer 1960: 22). One responsibility of the existing relation-
ship is market research. This is absolutely necessary in order to stabilize and 
increase the members’ competitive abilities, however, for cost reasons it can-
not be carried out by the members themselves. Therefore, the co-operative has 
to offer this service. The co-operative’s duty to keep its members informed, in 
this case, is closely connected with an increased integration of the members 
into the co-operative society. At the same time, a “reversal of the steering sys-
tem” happens. Due to these development trends, the co-operative’s manage-
ment does not only influence the production process of the co-operative with 
regard to goods and services; but, at least partially, it also governs the activi-
ties of their members’ own enterprises (e. g. retail stores with a joint market-
ing strategy). 
The formal structures of power and influence are reversed: The members 
are no longer able and competent enough to give orders to the co-operative’s 
management regarding the promotion task. Even defining their individual in-
terests proves to be very difficult. Consequently, the members engage profes-
sionals for the co-operative’s board of executives which in turn provides them 
with recommendations on how to improve their own, individual situation. The 
management staff does not only act in an advisory capacity but is permitted to 
enforce orders (Münkner 1978: 108). 
This reversal of roles makes it fairly difficult for members of the co-
operative to decide whether certain business ventures were necessary and part 
of the promotion duty or whether they happened due to particular managerial 
interests. 
Describing today’s situation is not enough, however; for a better under-
standing of the current structure of co-operative governance, the application of 
a suitable instrument for analysis seems necessary. Such an instrument can be 
found, e. g., in property rights theory. 
5.  Property Rights Theory and Co-operatives 
While other parts of the new institutional economics (e. g. principal agent the-
ory, transaction cost theory) have already been applied to co-operative re-
search with some success, property rights theory has as yet been only rarely 
used in this regard. At the same time, the traditional structure of co-operatives, 
namely of co-operatives in Germany, has found itself to be in the middle of a 
somewhat controversial discussion. Especially subscribers to the shareholder 
value philosophy have criticised the co-operative structure as lacking in incen-
tives and being outmoded. Maybe property rights theory has some input to 
offer for the proposed reforms.    17
Property rights theory is a concept which focuses on a person’s or an insti-
tution’s rights to act. As a rule, it may be said that no one has either the per-
mission or the ability to enforce all rights that exist regarding a specific prop-
erty. Awarding the rights of one specific property to different persons is called 
“attenuation” (Furubotn/Pejovich 1972: 1146). As a rule of thumb it may be 
said that the higher the degree of attenuation, the lower the interest of a person 
to enforce his or her rights. 
The existing limitations to an individual’s property rights are to a large ex-
tent due to the requirements and barriers imposed on the individual by its 
socio-economic environment. Therefore, Alchian/Demsetz (1973: 17) regard 
property rights as “socially recognized rights of action”. 
Property rights exist not only regarding material goods, but also regarding 
services. Currently, even intellectual property rights are being discussed (Al-
bach/Rosenkranz 1997). Still a matter of dispute is whether property rights 
require a good to be in existence or not. While Dunn et al. (n. n.: 2) are in fa-
vour of the first view, when defining goods as everything that creates a bene-
fit, Castle emphasises a different aspect. From his standpoint, “property rights 
are defined in the law and serve as rules governing the utilization and transfer 
of rights to wealth” (Castle 1978: 2). The second concept even includes rights 
against people, e. g. the rights as well as the obligations of employees in their 
relationship towards their employer, their colleagues, the labour union, the 
government etc (Kramer 1996: 10). From this point of view not the good itself 
is being owned, but a collection of property rights that may vary depending on 
socio-economic conditions. 
The form in which property rights exist depends to a large extent on societal 
institutions, like traditions, conventions, ethics, and written or unwritten law: 
Different institutional frameworks lead to different sets of property rights. Ac-
cording to Tietzel (1981: 210), a complete formulation of property rights al-
lows the exclusive but not unlimited use of a resource and contains four major 
categories of (sub-)rights:  
1.  The right to use a resource (usus),  
2.  the right to retain its profits (usus fructus),  
3.  the right to vary its form and substance (abusus), and  
4.  the right to leave it to somebody else under mutually agreed conditions. 
Theoretically, there exists a definite allocation of all rights, preferably to one 
person. This person then is permitted to exercise all rights from all four cate-
gories whichever way he wants.    18 




The right to retain its profits 
(usus fructus)
The right to vary itsf o r m  a n dsubstance 
(abusus)
The right to leave it to somebody else 
under mutually agreed conditions
The right to use a resource 
(usus)
 
Source: By  Author. 
In reality, however, the allocation of property rights is far from this hypotheti-
cal situation. There are cases where each category of rights is allocated to a 
different person. This requires a lot of communication whenever a specific 
action concerns the rights of different persons.   19




The right to retain its profits
(usus fructus)
The right to vary itsf o r m  a n dsubstance
(abusus)
The right to leave it to somebody else 
under mutually agreed conditions
The right to use a resource 
(usus)
 
Source: By  Author. 
It becomes even more complicated if the rights of one category are allocated 
to more than one person. According to the subrights that a specific person 
owns, this may enable him to veto a broad variety of activities. In extreme 
situations, the rights may even have been allocated to (groups of) persons with 
opposing interests and/or economic influence and power.   20 




The right to retain its profits
(usus fructus)
The right to vary itsf o r m  a n dsubstance
(abusus)
The right to leave it to somebody else 
under mutually agreed conditions
The right to use a resource 
(usus)
 
Source: By  Author. 
6.  Attenuation of Property Rights  
It has already been mentioned that in the real world a complete allocation of 
all property rights to a single individual or institution is extremely unlikely. 
Instead, the property rights regarding a specific good are divided into different 
sets and allocated to various individuals and institutions, based on law, power, 
force, or other ways of gaining ownership. The reasons for this attenuation 
may be due to legal, moral, similar restrictions, or transaction costs.  
The term “transaction costs” in this context covers all costs that evolve in 
the process of definition, exchange, surveillance, and enforcement of property 
rights (Leipold 1983: 57). Increasing these costs for exercising and enforcing 
the property rights of an individual or an institution decreases the range of 
possible actions (Leipold 1983: 57) while simultaneously reducing the incen-
tives for economic activity and the enforcement of property rights (Kramer 
1996: 16). Similar reactions may be caused by restrictions based on the socio-  21
economic environment, which are opposed to or even prohibit certain activi-
ties. Examples for such behaviour are drug-pushing, driving while intoxicated, 
or allowing stores to conduct business on Sundays or holidays. The higher the 
transaction costs and the fewer the allowed activities, the higher is the degree 
of attenuation, thereby increasing the development of positive or negative ex-
ternalities (Tietzel 1981: 212). 
Incomplete specification of property rights and the evolution of external ef-
fects will happen whenever the enforcement costs do not enter into the calcu-
lation of the acting individual or institution. Such external effects may be ad-
vantageous as well as disadvantageous for third parties, as shown in the exam-
ple of a supermarket parking lot. If parking is free of charge, not only will the 
customers benefit from it, but also other car owners who are more than likely 
to use the parking lot without making any purchases in the supermarket. The 
costs for the parking of non-customers are included in the prices of the goods 
bought by the customers, no matter if they use the parking lot or not. Such 
“free rider effects” are more likely to occur in cases of common property when 
it is impossible to exclude someone from its use. To a certain degree, it can 
also be observed in the case of co-operative property (Kramer 1996: 17). 
The distribution of property rights within an organisation is influenced by 
two parameters: The formal rules that have been laid down in writing, like 
statutes, by-laws, and general business law, and the more informal structures 
of influence, based on status, power, superior information, and similar aspects. 
In the next paragraph, the formal rules – as laid down in the German co-
operative law, will be examined. 
7.  Structural Influences of the Legal Form, the Registered Co-operative 
Based on the legal form of a registered co-operative in Germany, two impor-
tant aspects of its structure may be distinguished. The first of these is a general 
structure which is mandatory for all registered co-operatives.
8 Secondly, a 
large number of structural details of the co-operative are influenced by or 
originate from its activities, its branch, its size, and/or similar factors. 
7.1. General  Structure 
All registered co-operatives in Germany consist of an executive board, a su-
pervisory board, and a general assembly or a representative assembly, depend-
ing on the size of the co-operative.  
Since 1974, the executive board is directly responsible for all business ac-
                                           
8   Co-operatives that are organised as joint stock companies, limited liability companies, or 
in any form other than a registered co-operative are not taken into consideration within 
this paper.   22 
tivities of the co-operative (§ 27 (1) GenG (co-operative law)). Only extraor-
dinary decisions with a great impact on the future development of the co-
operative (e. g. mergers) require the assent of the supervisory board or even of 
the general or representative assembly. In all other aspects, decisions of the 
executive board can not be vetoed before they are realized. In general, the ex-
ecutive board is responsible for all decisions concerning the day-to-day-
business of the co-operative enterprise. 
The supervisory board in most regards acts, as the name implies, as a super-
visory institution and therefore is no real counterpart for the executive board. 
With the exception of those very few transactions where its consent is required 
for its realization, the supervisory board may be informed before the act, but 
without the rights to prevent activities or transactions. Only after the fact the 
supervisory board may evaluate the effect and the usefulness of a given activ-
ity. If it is dissatisfied, it may act accordingly. In severe cases, the board may 
even suspend members of the executive board. In general, the supervisory 
board is responsible for the supervision of the executive board and those deci-
sions concerning the business of the co-operative enterprise that are not part of 
the day-to-day-business. 
In principle, the most important body is the general assembly. Theoretically, 
it not only elects the members of the board, but also carries out the annual 
closing of the accounts, and evaluates whether the co-operative’s members 
have been sufficiently promoted. A closer look at the typical proceedings, 
however, reveals a somewhat different situation in which the assembly accepts 
the suggestions of both the executive and the supervisory board without much 
discussion.
9 The general meeting is responsible for the supervision of both the 
executive and the supervisory board, for decisions of an extraordinary nature 
with regard to the co-operative enterprise, and for decisions concerning the co-
operative as a society (Münkner 1982: 70ff). 
In addition to these inner-co-operative bodies there is a fourth body in exis-
tence which is not a part of the co-operative itself, but mandatory for all regis-
tered co-operatives: The annual audit by a co-operative auditing association 
(Münkner 1982: 76ff). 
7.2. Structural  Details 
While the above mentioned requirements are imposed on all registered co-
operatives in Germany, co-operatives are nevertheless required to find an or-
ganizational structure within the legal framework that fits their individual 
needs. Even though this organizational structure is greatly dependent on the 
co-operative in question it nevertheless is possible to discern those tendencies 
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that are caused by the discrepancy between member’s expectations and market 
requirements. 
These strains within a co-operative are most obvious in worker’s co-
operatives (Kramer 1997a: 119-121; Kramer 2003a: 17-23) and farming co-
operatives but they exist in other co-operatives as well. The main cause of 
these strains is the dual nature of a co-operative: On the one hand, the co-
operative is an enterprise that has to compete in a market; on the other hand, it 
is a society that has to promote its members. These opposing interests have to 
be balanced within every co-operative and the way they are balanced depends 
very much on the stage of co-operative development, the business branch, and 
the size of the enterprise. 
As a rule, it may be said that the larger the enterprise is, the stronger the 
market pressure will be and the lesser the influence of the members. This is 
especially true for co-operatives with a very large number of members, e. g. 
consumer co-operatives and credit co-operatives. In these cases, the boards 
will not only gain influence at the members’ expense, but at the same time 
there will be a tendency to award market influences a higher significance than 
member’s interests.  
The more members there are within a co-operative, the smaller is the influ-
ence of an individual member. The less influence a member has the lower 
tends to be his or her interest in the co-operative, his “feeling of belonging”. 
Therefore, the members of the boards, namely of the executive board, will 
gain influence, while the general assembly will lose importance. 
For similar reasons, the market influence will be of lower importance in the 
case of an executively operating co-operative (Dülfer 1995: 93) than in either 
a market-linkage co-operative or an integrated co-operative. Not only does the 
executively operating co-operative tend to be smaller in size, but also closer to 
its members. The duty to promote the co-operative’s members has a stronger 
impact.  
This becomes obvious by examining more closely the typical market-
linkage co-operatives (e. g. credit co-operatives, consumer co-operatives, 
housing co-operatives) or integrated co-operatives (e. g. taxi co-operatives, 
retail co-operatives). Either the co-operative tends to do business with non-
members as well as with members, or the market pressure causes a centraliza-
tion of decision power within the co-operative. 
8.  The Allocation of Property Rights within a Co-operative 
For an evaluation of the allocation of property rights within a co-operative, it 
is necessary to reconsider the four major areas of rights: The right to use a re-
source (usus), the right to retain its profits (usus fructus), the right to vary its 
form and substance (abusus), and the right to leave it to somebody else under 
mutually agreed conditions.   24 
Looking at these major areas of property rights, it becomes obvious that the 
rights regarding the use of the resource are awarded to the executive board. In 
this regard, the co-operative is quite similar to other enterprises. The manage-
ment is supposed to use the resources in the best possible way in order to pro-
mote the members. 
The right to retain the profits is, at least formally, awarded to the general or 
representative assembly. In German co-operatives, the general assembly for-
mally passes the balance sheet and the win and loss statement (§ 48 (1) GenG 
(co-operative law)) (Metz 1997: 771ff). The executive board draws up the bal-
ance sheet and the win and loss statement; the general assembly, however, is 
permitted to change it. 
The rights regarding the variation of the co-operative’s form and substance 
are allocated to different bodies. According to German co-operative law, the 
co-operative has to focus on the promotion of its members. Neither the general 
assembly nor the boards can vary the core of the co-operative. If such far 
reaching changes are desired, the co-operative has to be transformed into a 
different kind of enterprise. At a lower level, the general assembly is permitted 
to vary the form and the substance of the co-operative, namely with regard to 
the “society” part of the co-operative. Regarding the “enterprise” part, there is 
a threefold hierarchy within the co-operative: The executive board has the 
right to perform minor changes in the form and substance, while the supervi-
sory board may permit moderate changes. The most important changes have to 
be decided upon by the general assembly or by the representative assembly. 
The right to leave the co-operative enterprise to somebody else is exclu-
sively within the power of the general assembly, as it would be of the utmost 
importance for the future development of the co-operative. Therefore it has to 
be decided on by the owners, the members of the co-operative. 
Assessing the current allocation of property rights within German co-
operatives, it becomes obvious that they show a high degree of attenuation. 
Therefore, the actual allocation is similar to the one shown in figure 3. 
9.  Where are the Problems? 
Even though the allocation of property rights is fairly specified, due to the 
German co-operative law, there exist several problems regarding this alloca-
tion and the attenuation caused by it (Kramer 2002: 295ff). Some of these 
problems are based on the law itself, some of them have evolved due to lack of 
enforcement of the rights mentioned above. All of this tends to have some in-
fluence on the four characteristic features of a registered co-operative: Promo-
tion principle, identity principle, democracy principle, and solidarity principle 
(Flieger 1996: 20ff; Kramer 1999: 167). This influence simultaneously affects 
the corporate governance structure of the co-operative, as we will see.   25
9.1.  The Promotion Principle 
Every co-operative has to fulfil its promotional obligation towards its mem-
bers. Promotional obligation or promotion principal in this context means: 
Who will benefit in which way from the co-operative’s activities. The main 
difficulty, however, is defining the exact extent of this obligation. While the 
promotional obligation was fairly easy to define in the very first (traditional or 
executively operating) co-operatives, it has recently become much harder to 
specify how a co-operative is supposed to promote its members. The right to 
use the resources has been awarded to the executive board, but the members 
are still required to designate the goals for which these resources should be 
used.  
It is a moot point whether this setting of goals is part of the right to use the 
resources or part of the right to retain the profits. However, if the members do 
not define the goals, they are virtually unable to accurately ascertain whether 
they have been promoted or not.  
Theoretically, the members define the goals for the co-operative, thereby 
simultaneously defining the promotional obligation for the co-operative’s 
management. Instead, a closer look at the proceedings at general assemblies 
reveals that the members do not define the co-operative goals at all. Therefore, 
the promotional obligation is in danger of becoming hollow.  
Engels (1997: 675) even considers the promotional obligation to be just an 
empty phrase. He states that all former attempts to fill the concept of a promo-
tional obligation with life have failed. As a consequence, property rights re-
garding the definition of the promotional obligation have been acquired by the 
co-operative’s management, namely the executive board. 
Even though Engels’ arguments are somewhat biased since there is not even 
a hint of differentiation between co-operatives that differ in size, branch, or 
development stage, it can not be denied that there is a tendency among execu-
tive boards to acquire the right to define their own goals. This tendency seems 
to increase in accordance with the size of the co-operative and the number of 
its members. It seems to be strongest among market linkage co-operatives, 
where the general assembly has been replaced by a representative assembly. 
Property rights theory offers an explanation for this development: transac-
tion costs for the individual member are higher than the gains he could expect 
from a definition of the promotional obligation. Therefore, the definition of 
the promotional obligation becomes similar to that of a communal property, 
which has been informally claimed by the group with a more favourable cost-
gains-ratio. The groups with low transaction costs and a chance for higher 
profits are the executive board and to a lesser degree the supervisory board. 
Their transaction costs were lower because they had fewer people to convince 
to act jointly, and they also had the benefit of superior information. At the   26 
same time, they could profit from a non-defined promotional obligation, as 
this increased the difficulties to control whether they fulfilled their obligation 
at all. The fact that the allocation of property rights provided by § 27 (1) in the 
amendment of the co-operative law in 1973 was demanded by the manage-
ment professionals (Lenfers 1994: 68-69) is evidence for such a development. 
The paragraph in its current form states that the executive board is empowered 
to handle all day-to-day business activities, limited only by the by-laws (Het-
trich/Pöhlmann 1995: 140).  
If the transaction costs for member’s involvement were high before these 
legal changes, they are close to prohibitive now, at least in those co-operatives 
with a large number of members. In most of these co-operatives there is no 
general assembly but a representative assembly, where it is even more difficult 
(i. e. more costly transaction-cost-wise) for an ordinary member to convince 
the assembly, especially if he is not a member of the representative assem-
bly.
10 Besides, in many co-operatives the election lists for the representative 
assembly and the supervisory board are drawn up under the close supervision 
of the executive board. This enables the executive board with the chief execu-
tive officer as its key member, to handpick the persons who are to supervise its 
activities. The corporate governance structure is kept formally intact, but is 
weakened in its core. 
Another problematic area has been pointed out by Engels, who emphasizes 
that the increase of reserves tends to decrease the importance of the share capi-
tal that is directly owned by the co-operators. If a member decides to leave the 
co-operative he receives no share of the accumulated reserves (Engels 1997: 
676). Therefore, whenever members decide to increase the reserves they vote 
away a share of their profits without ever having a chance to share in this part 
of the capital stock, with the notable exception of a liquidation of the co-
operative. Employing the terminology of property rights theory, it is obvious 
that the members decide to surrender a certain part of their set of property 
rights. It is, however, uncertain what they receive in return – if anything at all.  
If the promotional obligation is well defined and obeyed by the manage-
ment of the co-operative, the real impact of this property rights disclaimer is of 
comparatively low importance. In this case, members will benefit from the 
better performance of the co-operative which will become possible due to the 
higher capital stock. If the promotional obligation tends to be fuzzy, as has 
been argued above, the members receive no compensation at all. They waive 
their rights in deference to the executive board – which further weakens the 
corporate governance structure. 
The rights to vary the form and substance of the co-operative seem to be of 
comparatively low importance. Therefore, hardly any problems can be ob-
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served regarding this set of rights and its allocation. A notable exception may 
be found in the banking sector, where numerous mergers have happened dur-
ing the last couple of years. This development is, for the most part, likely to 
continue in the foreseeable future. An ad hoc evaluation regarding the impact 
of mergers on members’ rights is very difficult. Therefore, further research is 
required. 
The fourth set of property rights focuses on the right to leave the property to 
somebody else. In this case, two aspects have to be distinguished. On the one 
hand, there is the member’s right to leave its share to somebody else, on the 
other hand there is the possibility of leaving the co-operative itself to some-
body else.  
Engels focuses exclusively on the first aspect and reaches the conclusion 
that the law creates a severe attenuation of the property rights of members. He 
states that the only way for a member to leave the co-operative is to terminate 
the membership, to return the shares and to receive the share in the capital 
stock. According to Engels (1997: 676), this attenuation of the member’s 
property rights further increase the property rights of the executive board.
11 He 
points out the absence of a secondary market for co-operative shares and fails 
to recognize the low necessity for such a market: As a rule, current members 
of the co-operative can terminate the membership and receive the par value of 
their shares, while prospective members need only apply for membership, 
provided they meet the requirements (e. g. owning milk stock for the member-
ship in a dairy co-operative). 
Engels claims that the executive board is enabled by these regulations to 
follow a strategy of member selection, pushing unwanted members out of the 
co-operative while choosing desired applicants for membership. Theoretically, 
this could happen, but empirical evidence for Engels’ statement seems to be 
missing. 
It has to be admitted, however, that Engels is right insofar as a co-operative 
member’s property rights differ from those of a shareholder in a joint stock 
company. Whether this is indeed a higher attenuation as Engels claims or only 
a difference in allocation, is still to be argued. Once again, the promotional 
obligation is of great importance. If the promotional obligation is fulfilled, 
disadvantages for the members due to this allocation of rights are hardly no-
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ticeable. If the promotional obligation is not fulfilled, however, the drawbacks 
for the member are severe. 
9.2.  The Identity Principle 
The identity principle states that theoretically all members of the co-operative 
are identical with one well-specified group of clients. These co-operative cli-
ents may be customers, either on the supply side (e. g. retail co-operatives) or 
on the demand side (e. g. consumer co-operatives, housing co-operatives), or 
employees (e. g. workers co-operatives). Therefore the property rights of the 
members are supposed to represent an identical influence via their capital 
share and via their share of transactions with the co-operative.
12 
Reality, however, proves that this theoretical model currently is valid only 
in very few cases, mainly in supply side co-operatives. For the majority of co-
operatives, non-member transactions have become quite typical. 
The property rights of the members have been influenced by this develop-
ment quite drastically, as non-member transactions tend to decrease members’ 
economic importance. While the property rights stay formally the same, they 
are devaluated economically. The more transactions are carried out with non-
members the lower is the importance of the members. This does not only cre-
ate a certain bias on the part of the co-operative management towards non-
members; but, it may even lead to a transformation of the co-operative into a 
capitalist enterprise or cause an economic failure of the co-operative. The most 
notable examples for such developments have happened in consumer co-
operatives. In both cases the promotional obligation suffered as well. 
Farming co-operatives find themselves in a very special situation because 
they tend to have a very heterogenous membership structure: current land-
owners, former landowners, current employees, former employees, financial 
investors, are only five groups of members that can have very diverse inter-
ests. At the same time, not all landowners and/or all employees are members 
of the co-operative. This does not necessarily mean that the co-operative be-
comes impossible to manage, but it sure makes it difficult to balance mem-
bers’ interests.  
9.3.  The Democracy Principle 
With regard to the democracy principle, it may be supposed that all members 
have an equal influence on co-operative matters, as is to be expected by the 
concept “one man, one vote”. Instead, reality proves to be different. 
The democracy principle in co-operatives has become somewhat meaning-
                                           
12  In this context a possible proportional gap between the capital share and the transaction 
share will be neglected, even though such gaps exist.   29
less for two different reasons. Firstly, the German co-operative law prescribes 
for registered co-operatives a mandatory hierarchy of at least three, but in 
many co-operatives of four levels: Executive board, supervisory board, gen-
eral assembly or representative assembly, and ordinary members (in case of a 
representative assembly). 
Even though all these levels are exclusively staffed with members of the co-
operative, the influence and the access to information varies immensely. 
Therefore, a certain lack of control can be observed in many co-operatives 
(Kramer 1997b: 29-34). 
The democratic influence of the members is therefore predetermined by the 
co-operative law, depending on their role within the co-operative. A certain 
attenuation of property rights is evident. 
Secondly, the legal cause for this fact finds a counterpart in kind in organ-
izational theory. As Boettcher (1974: 59ff) points out, it is next to impossible 
to run any kind of organization that has more than a very small number of 
members in accordance with a veto right for individual members. Larger or-
ganizations require some kind of a hierarchy to enable at least minimum effi-
ciency. For this reason, unequal distribution of democratic influence is un-
avoidable. 
Such an unequal distribution, nevertheless, requires an adequate control 
mechanism in order to avoid unwanted and unwarranted influence of certain 
members and of certain levels within the co-operative. A suitable organiza-
tional solution is needed. 
9.4.  The Solidarity Principle 
Whether or not any difficulties exist regarding the attribution or attenuation of 
property rights in the realm of the solidarity principle is very difficult to 
evaluate. This is mainly due to the fact that the solidarity principle itself con-
tinues to be somewhat fuzzy in its content. Who is supposed to be the recipient 
of the solidarity? How is the solidarity to be exercised? How is the solidarity 
to be measured? 
For these reasons, it is very hard to evaluate whether the solidarity principle 
is put into practice in the first place, not to mention whether or not the indi-
vidual’s property rights are obeyed. 
Nevertheless, there are some examples that throw some light on the difficul-
ties of this principle. Typical examples are retail co-operatives that usually 
offer discounts to customers with large volume orders. In such cases the ques-
tion is raised as to whether or not such discounts are an infringement of the 
solidarity principle. The poorer customers that are in a greater need of promo-
tion are denied these discounts due to their smaller orders, while the stronger 
and wealthier members receive an additional benefit. On the other hand, there 
is the peril that the stronger members might leave the co-operative (and estab-  30 
lish a co-operative of their own) if they do not receive such discounts. In turn, 
this may lead to an even worse situation for the smaller members of the co-
operative. 
10.  What could be done? 
A closer look at the problems mentioned above reveals that the heart of the 
matter lies in the definition of the promotional obligation. If the current situa-
tion is to continue, the promotional obligation is well on its way to becoming 
an “empty phrase” as stated by Engels (1997: 683). Consistent with such a de-
velopment, several co-operatives in Germany are in danger of losing their spe-
cial characteristics. In the end, this might even jeopardize their continued exis-
tence as a co-operative. 
A possible solution for many problems that are linked to the promotional 
obligation has already been described by Boettcher (1980: 82ff, 99ff) several 
years ago. His concept of a promotion plan and a promotion report would 
solve many of the problems that have mentioned above. For reasons of brev-
ity, this concept shall not be described here as it has received sufficient atten-
tion in various publications (Boettcher 1979; Weber/Brazda, 1994: 738)). 
The two main reasons why the promotion plan, as well as the promotion re-
port, is used only in a minority of co-operatives are its complexity and ist costs 
on the one hand (Kramer 2006) and the executive boards’ unwillingness to 
implement it on the other hand. During the last couple of years, the manage-
ment staffs of the co-operatives, namely the executive boards, have acquired 
numerous rights that used to belong to the general assembly and/or the super-
visory board. To some extent, these rights have been allocated to the boards by 
the last amendment of the co-operative law. Most of these rights, however, 
have been obtained because the transaction cost situation was in favour of the 
managerial interests instead of the members’ interests. Since the promotion 
plan and promotion report would reduce the property rights of the executive 
boards, the boards are quite unlikely to support such changes. Transaction 
costs that would result from the formulation and execution of a promotion 
plan and promotion report are an additional reason for the lack of implementa-
tion.  
Currently, there seem to be three ways out of this dilemma: 
1. Convincing the boards with arguments from co-operative theory that the 
promotion plan and the promotion report would strengthen the structure of 
the co-operative. 
2. A change of the co-operative law making promotion plan and the promotion 
report mandatory for co-operatives, as has been argued in earlier papers 
(Kramer 2003: 17; Kramer/Brazda 2004: 58). 
3. Convincing the boards with business arguments that the promotion plan and 
the promotion report would increase business opportunities for co-  31
operatives in a competitive economic environment. 
The first path has been pursued for a long time, however, with hardly any no-
ticeable results. Arguing for a promotion plan may not be harmful, but it does 
not seem to be effective. 
The second way seems fairly sensible, especially as the German co-
operative law is currently undergoing an amendment process. Unfortunately, 
promotion plan and promotion report receive only little attention within this 
discussion. One of the reasons for this neglect may well be the fact that the 
promotion plan concept as designed by Patera (1981, 1986) and others is fairly 
complex, complicated, and costly. Therefore it may be assumed that a simpli-
fied concept of the promotion plan, structured along the lines of a controlling 
instrument and influenced by quality management aspects, might be less con-
troversial.  
This leaves the third alternative. Its major advantage would be that the im-
plementation of a promotion plan with the help of business arguments would 
lead to a win-win-situation: The members of the co-operative would win, be-
cause their interests become known to the co-operative managers: The co-
operative receives information on how its members would like to be promoted 
and supported. Ideally, this information would enable the managers of the co-
operative to offer those goods and services that the members are most inter-
ested in, thereby creating a better fit of supply and demand. This may even 
encourage the co-operative to offer new services in reaction to members’ in-
terests – thereby increasing sales, turnover and profitability. In such a situa-
tion, the managers might even be willing to accept the additional co-operative 
governance to which they are submitted by member feedback. 
The crucial point, however, is whether such “promise” of additional busi-
ness opportunities does exist in reality. If there is no “business ad-on” as a 
consequence of increased member participation and feedback, managers are 
not likely to accept either additional costs or co-operative governance routines. 
To find out whether member feedback on a less complex level that a formal 
promotion plan and report system contains information of business relevance, 
a research project has been started in Spring 2006 by “Forschungsgruppe für 
Kooperation, Netzwerke und Unternehmenstheorie” of Hochschule Wismar 
and Institut für Genossenschaftswesen an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. 
Members of the representative assembly of three major co-operative banks 
were sent a questionnaire on member promotion in their bank. The project has 
not been finished yet, but some results are already available.  
For instance, bankers had assumed that the most important reason for mem-
bership in a co-operative bank would be some financial attraction, e. g. a cur-
rent account free of charge. This assumption, however, did not receive any 
support from the questionnaire. Instead, members named integrity and honesty 
of the bank as the most important way of member promotion. All in all, mem-  32 
bers of co-operative banks – given the choice of discount banking and per-
sonal banking – seem to prefer personal banking, even if some competitors 
offer comparable services for a lower price. 
This indicates not only that members of co-operatives, even of big market-
linkage co-operatives, have specific reasons for becoming and staying a mem-
ber. It also indicates that co-operative members may have a lower price elas-
ticity regarding the financial services that they require. 
11. Summary 
In Germany exist a large number of co-operatives that are engaged in a broad 
variety of business activities. Their organisational structure is determined by 
co-operative law and to a lesser degree by statutes or by-laws. As has been 
shown for German rural co-operatives by applying property rights theory the 
corporate governance structure as determined by law is formally still in exis-
tence, while it actually has been shifted in favour of the executive board. This 
has created an imbalance where on the one hand no longer any corporate gov-
ernance is actually taking place while on the other hand members’ interests 
may easily be neglected, because it is the executive board that determines the 
members’ interests and also whether they have benefited from the co-
operatives activities.  
In theory, suitable instruments to improve the corporate governance struc-
ture within such co-operative are the promotion plan and the promotion report 
as developed by Boettcher. However, for transaction cost reasons and due to 
the current attenuation of property rights, it is unlikely that these instruments 
will be implemented without outside pressure, e. g. through a change in co-
operative law. 
A superior alternative to promotion plan and promotion report may be a 
combination of promotion task controlling and member oriented quality man-
agement. While such instruments would indeed improve members’ ability to 
execute co-operative governance, managers’ willingness to submit themselves 
to stronger governance may well be assumed to be very low. Taking into ac-
count the current distribution of property rights in big German co-operatives, 
managers will accept stronger governance structures only if some other incen-
tives exist. An ongoing research project indicates that such incentives might 
exist in the realm of improved business opportunities due to better information 
about members’ aims and needs.   33
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